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ABSTRACT
The article replies to the five comments to Political Self-Deception, 
from the more philosophical and epistemic remarks to the more 
political and historical ones. In the end, it summarizes the main 
points of the book as suggested by the discussion with the five 
comments.
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The five comments to my Political Self-Deception (2018) provide original insights on my 
work from different viewpoints; in this sense, they are complementary to each other and 
to my study: besides raising critical remarks, each of them prospects a different line of 
inquiry, and wonders whether the core idea of my book could be developed and applied 
in that area. From their different perspectives, each contribution enlarges my work and 
prepares the ground for specific researches and applications in different directions and 
disciplines, and I am grateful for their insightful criticisms. I shall consider each 
contribution in turn, starting from the comments more focused on the philosophical 
and epistemic aspects of SD, corresponding to the first part of my work, and then going 
to the more political and historical perspectives tackling with themes that I take up in 
the second part of the book.
Self-Deception or epistemic vices?
Neil Manson’s ‘Political Self-Deception and Epistemic Vices’ expresses his philosophical 
concerns, questioning, on the one side, the use of the invisible hand model to explain 
SD, and, on the other, the explanations of political failures by means of SD instead of 
epistemic vices. Manson underlines a difference in the invisible hand explanations in 
economic science compared to my SD explanation, and such difference makes him 
doubt that what I employ is indeed an invisible hand model. In economic explanations, 
individual actions to certain individual ends compose themselves in an unintended 
outcome, serving some different and unexpected collective purpose (Nozick 1974, 
1977). By contrast, ‘the hand, in individual SD, does not seem to be very much guided 
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by the individual’s own motives’; it seems rather a hand working ‘outside the agent’s 
consciousness’. Manson’s remark gives me the opportunity to specify the invisible hand 
model, whose role in my argument is very important for it allows me to keep together 
the intentionality of SD process with the unintentionality of SD outcome (the deceptive 
belief) (Political Self.Deception p.41). In fact, I hold that the steps undertaken by the 
agent to check whether p is true are intentionally taken and are motivated by the 
attempt to dispel the anxiety created by the evidence contrary to p. Thus, contrary to 
what Manson has remarked, the hand is indeed guided by the individual’s own motives. 
For the agent openly engages in the process of thinking and ruminating with the 
explicit motivation to scrutinize the evidence, but then, led astray by her wish that 
p be true, is exposed to biases and faulty twists, ending up with the desired yet 
unintentionally brought about belief that p is true. Agents are in fact unaware of 
their biased thinking, as much as social agents are unaware of the supply-demand 
law. In the social science, agents are unaware of the overall effect of the composition of 
their own actions; similarly, in SD, the agent is unaware of the overall effect of the single 
steps she is taking in her reasoning and of their faultiness. In either case, actions (or 
steps) elsewhere directed jointly bring about an unintended, yet beneficial outcome. In 
case of SD, the outcome can be said beneficial insofar as it corresponds to the agent’s 
wish and eases her anxiety, at least in the short term. In brief, it seems to me that the 
invisible hand model neatly fits the process leading to SD providing an account of the 
three elements for SD production: the intentional steps, the causal biasing, and the 
unintended deceptive belief that results from the process.
The second critical remarks by Manson refer to the area of study of epistemic virtues 
and vices (Zagzebski 1996; Fairweather and Zagzebski 2001; Cassam 2019) which, to his 
mind, can provide a more nuanced explanation of the various epistemic failings leading 
to bad political decisions. Arrogance, inattentiveness, failure to give credibility to 
certain sources based on prejudice, to his mind, can offer an idiographic explanation 
of certain mistakes, whereas SD provides only a general explanation, but with much less 
details. Manson himself responds to his remark saying that the two explanations can 
supplement each other, the first providing a sort of general model, while the second 
getting into the specifics of singular cases. I doubt that Manson’s proposed solution 
would work, given that the epistemic vice perspective, compared with SD, does not 
simply provide a more detailed and nuanced tool for the analysis of epistemic failings; 
the epistemic vice approach views mistakes as the consequences of bad character 
dispositions, and of the agent’s failure to cultivate good epistemic habits. 
Cassam (2019) even understands cognitive biases as the possible outcome of epistemic 
vices. I tend to resist Cassam’s suggestion for cognitive biases seems to be spread among 
all sorts of people, even intelligent and generally accurate. In general, as I have argued at 
length in the book, I do not think that SD depends on a certain type of character 
(corrupted by epistemic vices); on the basis of a wide literature in experimental 
psychology, SD seems rather to be produced under the effect of given typical circum-
stances. Anyone can be and is sometimes struck by SD under certain circumstances, 
though I can agree that some epistemic vices make it easier to fall prey of SD. That is 
why my suggestions at SD prevention mainly rely on institutional mechanisms rather 
than on education in epistemic virtues. Most importantly, as Manson himself acknowl-
edges, SD points to the motivation behind the faulty reasoning, which is instead absent 
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in the epistemic vice explanation, and explains the mistake as the outcome of motivated 
reasoning. In case, the epistemic vice explanation seems more appropriate for simple 
mistakes than for proper cases of motivated twisted reasoning. Finally, I actually try to 
provide a general model to explain not all faulty reasoning and decisions, but the small 
portion where a motivation can be detected as lurking behind the process. In other 
words, my problem is not epistemic failing per se, but rather motivated reasoning 
against the available evidence. In sum, my reservation on Manson’s suggestion to 
supplement the general model of SD with the idiographic tools from the epistemic 
vice literature refers to two main reasons. On the one hand, SD is not a general model 
to interpret cognitive mistakes, but rather an account of motivated reasoning, and, on 
the other, my account of SD does not imply a link with a certain defective character, as 
it is the case with epistemic vices.
The available evidence and the impartial umpire
I shall now consider the comments by Alfred Moore ‘Reality Check: Can Impartial Umpires 
Solve the Problem of Political Self Deception?’, for his contribution too is focused on 
epistemic matters. More precisely, the issue he raises concerns the evidence that constitutes 
the benchmark for detecting self-deception. In my own definition ‘SD is believing that P, 
under the influence of the desire that P be the case, when the available evidence would lead 
an unmotivated cognizer to conclude that ~P’ (p.19). In order for SD to be detected, then 
the available evidence is paramount as well as some unmotivated observer who plays the 
role of an umpire, as Moore says. Moore points out that the available evidence is rarely 
clear-cut, but, especially in politics, usually complex, fragmented, available only in pieces 
and bits, often contradictory. And he is right: often only in hindsight one can have a clear 
view of the data. That is also the reason why singling out cases of SD in politics is hard, and 
there is always a controversy about what evidence was actually and clearly available at the 
time of the decision. Moore’s remark, however, goes deeper than that: not only is the 
available evidence often foggy and complex, but, moreover, it is not an ‘impartial umpire’ 
who, by virtue of his impartiality, can appraise it correctly. The reason he offers is twofold: 
first, the assessing of evidence always implies value-laden judgements, hence the reference 
to a dispassionate judge is misplaced; second, the relevance of disagreement and conflict in 
reaching collective decision is not given an adequate role in my suggestion of prophylactic 
measures against SD. Moore’s proposal is instead to correct the misperception brought 
about by SD with other situated and partial viewpoints. The plurality of misperceptions 
would induce conflict and disagreement, and out of that, a collective process will develop 
where individual self-deceivers will somehow correct each other and reach a better epis-
temic result, as predicted by studies such as Sperber and Mercier (2011) and Landemore 
(2012). In spelling out his proposal, Moore criticizes also the ambivalence he sees in my 
presentation of SD as a collective process. In Moore’s view, I describe collective SD halfway 
between a summative and an ‘emergentist’ (supervenient) process. If it is just summative, 
then the collective dimension is actually downplayed, while he thinks that it should be 
placed in the forefront. In general, Moore stresses that the cognitive distortions and 
defective decisions induced by SD should not be fought with the attempt to reinstate 
a correct epistemic process via an impartial, dispassionate observer, given that all appraisals 
of evidence and data interpretations always embody value-judgements and perspectival 
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approaches. Consequently, his suggestion is to let disagreement and conflict develop 
towards a more balanced and sound outcome, as the result of collective reasoning. In 
other words, the collective reasoning, seen as an emergentist process, could be the treat-
ment of the cognitive distortions, whether brought about by SD or by the different 
perspectival positions of each individual in the process.
I shall try to respond, starting with the issue of the ‘dispassionate umpire’ versus 
‘diverse participants’. Moore rightly points out that evidence assessment is hardly 
a value-free, impartial process; yet, one thing is to assess the evidence from a situated 
point of view, and another to have a specific motivation for considering the evidence in 
a biased way, namely that the wish that p be true. I am not advocating a perfect 
impartiality and detachment from values and emotions; yet, the fact that our evalua-
tions are always situated and perspectival does not imply that we cannot be free from 
the influence of the emotionally overloaded wish that p in our reasoning. By ‘dispas-
sionate’ I precisely mean not sharing the ‘rebellious’ wish that p, which is what is 
relevant for SD process. To rephrase my own words, the cognizer is not unmotivated in 
general, but is free from the motivation with reference to p. What happens with cases of 
personal SD is precisely that the network of friends and relatives is able to detect the 
self-deception, given that none of them shares the same anxious wish that p with the 
subject. Hence, the subject’s belief looks aligned with the desire that p rather than with 
facts that the observers find more pending in favour of ~p.
Moving now to political SD, the context is much more complicated and messier than 
personal life, nevertheless the problem is similar, given that SD can be detected if data 
are approached with eyes not clouded by the specific wish that p be the case. Having the 
eyes unclouded by the wish that p does not imply to have a perfectly clear eyesight. 
Again, the problem is to break the vicious circle between the wish that p and the 
subsequent biased search and biased treatment of data in favour of p. I agree that 
a perfectly unbiased treatment of data is out of question, but what is relevant to detect 
SD is the absence of the influence of the wish that p. One thing is that the data are 
approached from a given perspective, another is that the wish that p sets in motion 
a process that results in the counter-evidential belief that p. In this respect SD cannot be 
confused with the perspectival nature of knowledge, for SD implies something more 
specific, namely that the belief that p runs against the available evidence, because of the 
motivation that p. The available evidence may not be beyond dispute, for sure, yet what 
is precisely counter-evidential is relatively easier to establish.
Let us now come to collective self-deception and to Moore’s suggestion that indivi-
dual SD can be a weapon against collective SD. I have actually described the process of 
collective SD at some length, as I stated: ‘contrary to what happens in cases of personal 
SD, political SD is almost always a collective product’ (p.100). The collective product is 
the result of the positions of different individuals and of the power structure of the 
group.1 In theory, a group provides more possibilities to confront information and data 
critically, to check biases and idiosyncrasies, to test hypothesis and to get to a better 
decision, but, in fact, the group can harbour pathologies depending on its internal 
power structure and on its ideological connotation (Janis 1982). Precisely the studies, 
1The stress on the power structure of the group is the point where my position of collective SD differs from Janis’s 
Groupthink (Janis 1982).
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quoted by Moore, on the outperformance of diverse groups over intelligent individuals’ 
show that the epistemic superiority of diverse groups works if anyone shares the 
problem-solving approach with the paramount motivation to reach the best result 
(Landemore 2012). SD, however, has precisely to do with motivations interfering with 
reasoning. As I have described, the members of the group need not share the same 
motivation, but the power structure and the fear to displease the leader and fall off his 
or her favour affect everyone. The different steps leading to SD are taken by different 
agents; for example, the conviction that p be true by some is taken by others as evidence 
that p be true. At the end, there is a process of reciprocal reinforcement of the deceptive 
belief so that it becomes collectively shared. In this case, collective reasoning has 
moreover the perverse effect of inducing group members to consider the stakes of the 
collective decision less than his or her personal stakes within the group, and that, in 
turn, lowers the costs for inaccuracy for each and helps the self-deceptive process to 
start. Thus, coming back to Moore’s remarks, collective SD is produced by the single 
steps taken by each individual member, but the outcome, collective SD, exhibits some 
supervenient properties, such as the illusion of invulnerability. Contrary to Moore’s 
view, though, I do not think that collective SD and individual SD can work against each 
other, providing the required check on decision making. In my conjectural reconstruc-
tion, the SD of individual members and of the whole group goes in the same direction; 
and even if in the group someone harbours doubts, hardly such doubts will be voiced 
effectively so as to check the decision process, because of the power structure and on the 
dependency on the leader. To put it differently, contrary to what Moore seems to think, 
the collective process is not driven by the search for accuracy and best outcome, as it is 
the collective reasoning by the groups considered by Mercier and Landemore, but is 
motivated as well as individual SD. I have especially stressed the power structure as the 
locus of epistemic distortions, and that is why, with reference to prophylactic measures, 
I am afraid that a devil’s advocate may not be effective for he or she may be taken in by 
the group structure. The quest for the independence of overseers concerns precisely the 
freedom from the power structure, and from the identification with the leader’s wish, 
and not the independence of an undetached point of view. My impression is that 
Moore’s suggestion to fight collective SD with individual SD equates SD with 
a perspectival approach to data, so that confronting many diverse perspectival views, 
a more balanced opinion may emerge. Yet SD is not simply a value-laden, oriented 
consideration of evidence: it is a specifically biased consideration of evidence, due to the 
influence of the emotionally loaded wish that p, resulting not just in a ‘partial’ or 
‘oriented’ view, but precisely in a counter-evidential belief. Thus while I agree with 
Moore’s stress on the oriented, partial and perspectival consideration of data, I like to 
keep SD as something more specific than such a general character of human knowledge.
Political theory and empirical evidence
Alice Baderin’s comments too, in ‘From Political SD to SD in Political Theory’, are 
centred on the issue of evidence, though in a different way than Alfred Moore’s. More 
precisely, she asks about the room for empirical evidence in political theorizing, 
exploring the possibility of extending the analysis of SD from politics to political theory. 
She points out that many political theorists may be found engaged in motivated 
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reasoning when they try to match their normative ideals with empirical evidence. The 
latter is often considered in a biased way, specifically tailored in order to be fitting their 
normative positions. In fact, as Baderin acknowledges, this is more a case of believing 
beyond evidence than believing against evidence, a case characterizing wishful thinking 
more than SD. Similarly, she notes that the wish to be edgy and provocative often 
underlies theoretical enterprises built on disagreement, where theory is guided and 
moulded out of the motivation to take a controversial position that no one can just 
ignore. Again, it is not clear that such is a case of SD or simply of letting theory be led 
by extra-theoretical desires. In general, I think that Baderin’s attempt to apply moti-
vated reasoning at the meta-theoretical level is very original and revealing, and that the 
avoidance of similar pitfalls concerning the role of empirical evidence in political theory 
should be taught to students as part of a sound methodology.
With reference to the role of empirical evidence, Baderin also raises a critical remark 
to my political SD, picking out what she holds to be a weakness in the empirical 
foundation of my normative claims. I hold that the favourable circumstances for 
political SD to take place are exceptional crises calling for momentous decisions 
under pressure of time. From these circumstances, my argument moves to the prophy-
lactic measures, for, thanks to the detection of favourable circumstances, SD is at least 
partially predictable in advance, while neither lies nor mistakes can be foreseen ex ante. 
On this argument, Baderin advances two critical comments, the first concerning the 
empirical circumstances that ground the normative claim about prophylactic measures, 
the second concerning the consideration of lying as unpredictable. Relative to the first 
point, Baderin precisely refers to time pressure and dramatic decision making. She 
observes that such circumstances are absent not only in cases of personal SD, but also in 
political SD when, for example, politicians are covering up past mistakes. How can they 
be the typical circumstance for SD to arise? Moreover, she stresses a sort of incon-
gruence between the exceptionality of circumstances and the predictability of the 
subsequent SD. I shall immediately clear this latter remark: exceptional circumstances, 
as a rule, are not anticipated, but the response to exceptional circumstances can be, as 
all disaster management studies testify. In our case, SD is the (at least partially) 
predictable response to exceptional, hence unanticipated, circumstances. Thus, there 
is no incongruence here. Focusing now on her first remark, Baderin is right in noting 
that time-pressure and momentous decision-making are not typical either of personal 
SD or of political SD, when at issue there is the ‘sour grapes’ mechanism for the 
cognitive dissonance reduction of past mistakes (Elster 1983). However, both time 
pressure and momentous decision making are simply instantiations of the contextual 
condition for SD to start that I have presented both at the end of chapter 1 (p.56) and at 
the beginning of chapter 3 (p.80). The contextual condition varies according to the kind 
and type of SD, as long as it is something that arouses anxiety in the subject and 
emotionally overloads the wish that p. In personal cases, the wish that p, which is 
something very important for the subject’s well-being, is emotionally turned on by the 
mere suspicion of evidence contrary to p. In the context of international politics, the 
wish that p is not connected to the personal well-being of the decision-maker, but 
rather to her strategic goals or to her popular image. In that case, the wish that 
p becomes anxious under the exceptional circumstances and under evidence unfavour-
able to p, which leads the decision maker towards a biased search for reconfirming p. 
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What about then the sour-grapes type of political SD (pp.93–95)? In that case, the wish 
to defend one’s cherished image against a failure is anxious and does not need time 
pressure or exceptional decision to become emotionally overloaded. The painful knowl-
edge of one’s failure is sufficient to push the subject to reassess the criterial evidence and 
realign what happened with his self-image. In sum, the contextual element, no matter 
what form it may take, has always the role of turning on the crucial wish leading to the 
(biased) appraisal of data and the search for a solution in line with the wish that p, 
despite the available evidence. True, the cases that I have analysed in depth in 
the second part of the book have all involved decision-making under conditions of 
time pressure and momentous crises, which in such cases represented the contextual 
element favourable to set in motion an SD process. And yet, time pressure and 
momentous decisions are not the only contextual condition arousing the wish that 
p and leading to a biased search of data.
Finally, Baderin contests my point that only SD can be predictable, while lies and 
mistakes are not. More precisely, she focuses on lying, and on the growing body of 
studies engaged in finding conditions under which lying may more easily take place, or 
may more easily be detectable in advance. Actually, it is not clear whether such 
conditions make lying predictable or just detectable. Certainly, the study of political 
speech pattern for lie detector is not useful for predicting lying (Bond et al. 2019), but 
also the list of conditions that Baderin gets from behavioural economics, which are 
tailored on individuals and not on groups, says more about how to discover a lie than 
how to predict it.2 Thus, while I cannot rule out the possibility of predicting lying in 
general, it seems to me that political SD, which is a collective product, is more clearly 
predictable than lying, which is an individual act.
The realist objection rephrased
Lior Erez, in his ‘What is Political about Political Self-Deception?’, raises the question 
which may have more disruptive effects on my work, for he asks from a realist 
perspective whether SD may represent a useful category in political analysis. I have 
actually considered such a question myself, in the Introduction, under the label ‘the 
realist objection’, and concluded that even from a realist viewpoint, SD can be useful for 
its explanatory role in making sense of certain political failure. Erez rebuts my argu-
ment. He starts by saying that realists have no difficulty in acknowledging that politics, 
like any other social sphere, has its own share of SD. The point is however whether 
political SD affects political judgement, in the double sense of negatively influencing 
political decisions and of inducing a negative evaluation of the policy chosen via a self- 
deceptive process. If that were the case, then SD would be a relevant category in 
political analysis, as held in my book. But Erez answers in the negative in either case, 
for to his mind neither SD necessarily entails poor political judgement, nor the political 
analyst has much to criticize the self-deceiver. The Realist is interested in outcomes and 
consequences, as Erez reminds us, and whether the political agent is lying or is self- 
2She quotes: tiredness and cognitive depletion; when the payoff is closer to the decision-point; awareness of future 
altruistic opportunities; a feeling of anonymity at the decision-point; seeking to cover a loss, rather than to make 
a gain; and when people with whom you identify are lying (Jacobsen, Fosgaard, and Pascual-Ezama 2018).
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deceived does not change the political scientist’s evaluation of decisions, actions and 
policies, as long as they are effective, given that the realist does not think that normative 
considerations are relevant for political judgements. To be fair: Erez thinks that there is 
room for political normativity, only well marked off and distinct from moral norma-
tivity, and stresses that private morality and political action are two separate spheres. In 
passing, no normative political theorist imagines that public reasons and public ethics 
should be the simple extension of private morality (Hampshire 1978; Larmore 2020). 
What are the specific normative questions appropriate to politics are left unclear, and 
I suppose that they have to do with effectiveness and efficiency relative to ends whose 
worth may be considered only in terms of feasibility. With this portrait of the con-
temporary realist, Erez considers my response to the Realist Objection ineffective for he 
denies that being self-deceived, that is believing something contrary to data, implies to 
bring about poor policies. Political actors, in his view, are not ‘neutral assessors of 
evidence and probability in the political landscape’ for they actively shape that land-
scape by their decisions and actions. Hence, the evidence is not ‘out there’, but rather 
created and moulded by human action. Now, no one denies that human action is 
causally efficacious in changing the state of things, but this trivial fact does not entail 
that in the decision moment the agent does not face a given evidence. The evidence may 
be complex and difficult to decipher, but it is nevertheless the given context from which 
decisions are taken. It seems to me that there is a non-sequitur in Erez’s argument: the 
fact that politicians are active in the context they are immersed in and contribute to 
change with their actions does not imply that their actions can dispense with a proper 
appraisal of the context, as if decisions take place in a void. If I say that the invasion of 
Iraq is required by the presence of WMD, and after the invasion the WDM are not 
found, despite the efforts and costs spent in several searches, then I have manifestly and 
publicly failed the invasion, or better I failed the reasons why the invasion had been 
justified internationally. Now if I had lied about that, I might have avoided ending up so 
exposed. Either I could have placed some weapons there to be found, or at least I would 
have avoided the searches. Thus, it seems to me that being self-deceived about certain 
facts does not fare good in terms of success and good result. It is true that sometimes 
a leap of faith may bring about the desirable consequences (the well-known self-fulfiling 
prophecy) and that excessive prudence may sometimes be detrimental. Yet, first, I will 
underline the ‘sometimes’, and second, one thing is the leap of faith, and another is 
going against hard facts. I concede that what the hard facts are is often difficult to 
establish in political reality, but precisely when the evidence is weighting in one 
direction decidedly, ignoring it and let oneself be led by one’s wishes is highly risky 
(and with the lives of other people) and never promising. In case of SD there is not only 
political responsibility for one’s mistakes, which as Erez emphasizes always kicks in for 
politicians; in such cases there is the moral and epistemic responsibility to have let one’s 
wishes (ends, convictions) distort the judgement. In sum, I do not find Erez’s rejoinder 
to my response to the Realist objection convincing. The fact that the politician is not 
a theorist or an expert whose task is just to provide data’s interpretation, and that he or 
she has to make decisions and to act does not imply that acting on the grounds of false 
data is a politically intelligent move. Even if occasionally, rarely indeed, the decision 
may not turn out in a fiasco, it is more a matter of luck than of political wisdom.
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In the second part of his comments, Erez takes up the normative evaluation of SD, as 
I have discussed in connection with the Iraqi invasion, and considers my two criticisms to 
the decision-making process, criticisms that he labels as the epistemic objection to SD and 
the democracy legitimacy objection. The epistemic objection, that is the tendency of 
collective self-deception to dismiss dissenting voice, is rashly considered in a sceptical 
fashion, because certainty is not part of political reality. Actually, certainty in the fallibilist 
epistemology that I favour is not part of human knowledge in general, but that does not 
exclude that listening to dissenting voice and considering alternative scenarios is an 
epistemic (and political) virtue as Neil Manson has stressed in his contribution. 
The second point, the democratic legitimacy objection, concerns not so much SD as the 
context in which the specific SD about WMD developed. The context was precisely the gap 
between the selling reasons and the real reasons for the invasion. Here I think that the 
distance between my position and Erez’s depends on the different evaluation of normative 
questions from the perspective of a normative political theorist and from that of a realist. It 
does not say much about my political SD, but rather about a fundamental disagreement 
related to the two approaches. I think that the existence of such a gap from the viewpoint of 
democratic ethics is extremely problematic because citizens should be informed about the 
reasons for waging a war and have a right to make up their mind about that, for war is 
waged by the whole country and there is a collective responsibility about that. Thus, I do 
not see that the fact of the professional army in any way justifies the disinformation of the 
public, and dispense with citizens’ collective responsibility. Nor do I share the point made 
by Erez that ‘there is no reason to think that the best justifications for engaging in a war are 
also going to be acceptable public reasons for engaging in a war’. In my perspective, the fact 
that the decision to waging a war is solidly grounded on a (partisan) interpretation of the 
national interest and has good chances of success does not provide a sufficient justification 
if it is not publicly acceptable. In a democracy there is no national interest beyond and 
above citizens’ convictions. I understand that for a realist the only relevant justification is 
not affected by citizenry acceptability, but that does not satisfy the normative political 
thinker who does not claim implausible standards, only that such a momentous decision is 
not taken by deceiving the public. And in the specific case of Iraq, the gap between the real 
reasons and the selling reasons was in no way justified by the necessity of surprise or similar 
lame excuses. In cases where there is no possibility to reconcile the effective decision to 
wage a war with the public reasons for it, maybe there is no cause for war at all.
SD in historical perspective
Shaul Mitelpunkt’s comments too are focused on war and international relations, yet 
from the perspective of the historian and not of the realist political theorist. While the 
political theorist is interested not only in analysing politics in an unprejudiced way 
outside the lens of moralized considerations, but also in providing guidelines for 
efficacious political action in similar circumstances, the historian is interested in 
reconstructing the broad picture, the general trend within which specific decisions, in 
case self-deceptive decisions, take place and make sense. In such a perspective, 
Mitelpunkt acknowledges that the category of SD can be analytically useful to the 
historian, widening the view of multiple causality with psychological and epistemic 
components. Nevertheless, Mitelpunkt is worried that my analysis of international crisis 
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and subsequent failures in terms of a deviant decision making affected by SD suggests 
the idea that problematic foreign policies are caused by singular wrong decisions. And 
the idea of prophylactic measures that I propose seems to move along the same 
direction, namely that once mended SD, then mistaken and wrongful policies, such 
as the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War and the Iraqi invasion would be avoided. 
Mitelpunkt is right in insisting that the cases that I have considered in Political Self- 
Deception are part of a general trend in American foreign policy that is problematic in 
its ideological premises and goals. I do not claim that my analysis provides a complete 
explanation of those events, and I hope to have made that clear in the book. I have also 
tried to show how shared ideological convictions, such as American exceptionalism and 
Cold War basic tenets, provided a fertile background for illusions and cognitive 
distortions at any turning point of those trends. My point is in a way more modest: 
I have tried to detect specific episodes of SD guiding decision making, when in the 
confusion of data, commitments and muscular postures, it has been possible to single 
out specific decisions based on counter-evidential belief. Such decisions were certainly 
backed by a complexity of factors, rooted in a long-lasting attitude in American foreign 
policy; nevertheless, they led to specific failures and had long-lasting consequences on 
that policy. I am not suggesting that, absent SD, American policy concerning Cuba, 
Vietnam and Iraq, would have adjusted and found a right path. I am only saying that 
those decisions might possibly be avoided, with all the surrounding deceptions, cover-
ing up, secrecy and drama. The treatment of SD – supposing now for a moment that it 
is an easy thing to do and to make it acceptable – will not mend a poor ideology and 
will not provide the background for fair convictions, but it may avoid certain specific 
tragic choices. In this respect, if, as Mitelpunkt emphasizes, the interpretation of 
a policy as successful may change according to the time span considered, the failure 
of a policy can more easily be measured by the destruction and death tolls it brings 
along. Finally, Mitelpunkt repeatedly notes that my analysis does not take into account 
the issue of democratic SD, or of the SD of the public. This is certainly a very important 
issue, and possibly more important than what I have been concerned with so far, but 
I had to start somewhere and the perspective on leaders’ decision making has allowed 
me to reconstruct SD more precisely. Moving towards the people’s SD can be the next 
project.
Concluding remarks
As a conclusion, I shall add some general remarks to the comments that my book has 
received. In the first place, I want to stress the specific role I assign to SD in politics. 
This role is not that of replacing either deception or cold mistakes in political decision 
making. Both deception and mistakes are present and have consequences on policies 
affecting their success or failure, and affecting the relation with the democratic public. 
Sometimes, however, mistakes are the result of motivated reasoning, on the one hand, 
while, on the other, the deception of the public results from the self-deception of 
politicians. Such cases are precisely cases of SD, where the decisions are informed by 
beliefs induced by motivation and are counter-evidential, hence false.
One of the examples discussed in the book refers to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in 
1964, during the Vietnam conflict, which never took place, but which was believed to 
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have occurred because it represented the much desired opportunity for the escalation of 
the American involvement in Vietnam. As I have reconstructed in detail, the decision to 
air reprisal against North Vietnam and its alleged attack in the Tonkin Gulf appeared at 
first to have been beneficial for the Johnson administration in terms of popularity and 
national support (176–177); and the short-term beneficial effect actually characterizes 
most cases of SD, both at the personal and at the political level.3 Yet, it was certainly not 
beneficial for the outcome of the conflict, nor in the end for the decision-makers. Later, 
in fact, the truth about the Tonkin affair started to surface, with the hearings promoted 
by Senator Fulbright in 1968, and that finally decided the end of the career of 
McNamara and of President Johnson, while the war went from bad to worst 
(MacNamara 1995). Considering this episode, it is hard to see how the harsh decision 
for the air strike, informed by a deceptive belief, could ever turn out to be a success, as 
Lior Erez maintains that decisions based on SD can. Similarly, it is difficult to share his 
view that from a realist perspective, the effect of SD on decision making is irrelevant. 
Possibly, the realist does not consider that the difference between simply cold mistakes 
and mistakes produced by SD is relevant, for in both cases, very likely, the decision 
leads to unwise policies. The explanation of the unwise policies, however, changes in 
either case: if it is just an epistemic mistake, possibly the reference to epistemic vices, as 
suggested by Moore, can provide an account. If instead the mistake is motivated, then 
SD can provide an explanation that, moreover, accounts also the deception of the public 
resulting from the SD of the leaders. I think that possibly Erez has conflated SD with 
positive thinking, which is an attitude of optimistic overconfidence pushing people to 
take bigger risks, sometimes succeeding in hazardous operation. But SD is more specific 
than that for it implies a belief that is brought about against the available evidence, 
hence, most of the time, false.
In sum, I hold that SD can display a strong explanatory power, yet only in a limited 
set of decision-making cases, namely those where the evidence available at the time runs 
contrary to the conviction of the decision makers. In other words, SD as an analytical 
category in politics cannot be overused. In that respect, Mitelpunkt’s concerns are 
unfounded. Even when SD can properly make sense of given episodes of decision 
making, in any case, the explanation in terms of SD requires a larger account concern-
ing why certain motivations were so powerful, and why they came to be emotionally 
loaded in such a way that led to a biased search for evidence. Such larger account is 
precisely what historians do when confronting with certain episodes, providing a more 
complex interpretation reaching further back than the SD explanation of a single 
decision-making process can ever do. Thus, Mitelpunkt need not worrying about 
reducing historical interpretations to psychological mechanisms, for political SD can 
only provide the account of a single step in a very complex process that requires an 
independent explanation. As said, I am not claiming that SD as a political analytical 
category can sort out all cases of decision making when momentous choices are at issue 
and when the circumstances are blurred and confused both epistemically and motiva-
tionally. Setting apart simple miscalculation from genuine uncertainty, and dishonesty 
3I say most and not all cases, for in the literature two different forms of SD have been distinguished: straight SD and 
twisted SD. The first type refers to cases when the self-deceptive belief corresponds to the wish of the subject. 
The second type refers to cases when the self-deceptive belief runs contrary to the wish of the subject, as the jealous 
husband who falsely become convinced of his wife’s infidelity without any supportive evidence (Galeotti 2016).
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and duplicity from SD is often a difficult task, as I have experienced in the analysis of 
cases, for all these elements are usually present and entangled. Yet, the analytical 
category of SD helps to dispel the fogs giving each element its due, and, without 
supposing that a single decision can change a long-lasting trend in foreign policy, it 
helps assessing the consequences and responsibility of that specific decision.
A few comments (Moore, Baderin, Erez) have raised the issue of evidence, though in 
different directions: some affirming that evidence is always value-laden and perspectival, 
some pointing out lack of sufficient evidence for my empirical claim concerning the 
circumstances of SD, and some stressing that politicians are not researchers assessing 
data, but contribute to mould political reality with their actions. I have already responded 
to each of these remarks above; now I want to take up the role of evidence in SD and its 
related problems. Clearly, we can detect SD only with reference to the evidence that the 
agent has available, and which points in the opposite direction concerning the self- 
deceptive belief. A belief is self-deceptive only if it runs contrary to the evidence the 
agent has in front of her eyes. For instance, Anna notices that her husband is spending 
more and more evenings in the office, is going to conference in the weekends, closes 
himself in his study to make telephone calls and receives texts all night. Disquieted by her 
husband’s behaviour, Anna ruminates over that evidence, focusing on a single positive 
example of her husband’s caring attitude, dismissing or explaining away the problematic 
ones, finally ending up with the belief that her marriage is just fine and her husband caring 
and present. Friends and relatives, to whom Ann confided her husband’s suspicious habits, 
conclude that she is self-deceived. In other words, there cannot be SD, if there is no 
evidence, available to the subject and pointing against the belief the subject has formed or 
has retained. This evidence needs not be conclusive, as in Anna’s case, yet it must 
relevantly weight against the belief held by the subject, belief that appears to be induced 
by the wish biasing the data rather than by a correct processing of data. Hence, the notion 
of contrary evidence, available at the subject, is crucial for SD to take place as well as for 
SD to be detected by observers. This notion, however, does not commit me either to 
a specific view of evidence, for example is compatible with the idea of a perspectival 
approach, or to a specific view of the observer as impartial in absolute terms. The observers 
simply do not share the agent’s wish, for which the available evidence represents a threat. 
I stress the adjective ‘available’, for what counts for SD is what the subject has in front of 
her, nor the objective evidence from an abstract viewpoint.
Finally, I want to remark that the second part of the book focused on SD in politics and 
on exemplary cases, is not independent of the first, concerning the philosophical discussion. 
Many political analysts have already referred to SD in order to explain policies that were 
both misguided and deceptive, yet their reference to a commonsense notion of SD has not 
had a relevant impact in political analysis. I contend that a well-specified concept of SD is in 
fact necessary for its fruitful application in politics, for only a rigorous conception of SD 
makes it possible to draw distinctions in the web of unwarranted beliefs, unexamined 
assumption, stubborn convictions and to pick out the actual episodes of SD. The analysis of 
the philosophical literature has led me to conclude that no single set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for SD could be enlisted, given the wide variety of SD phenomenology 
and its fuzzy boundary. If SD is to apply to social and political reality, the concept needs to 
be tailored to its real complexity and balance comprehensiveness with rigour. In such 
a spirit, I have proposed considering three minimal necessary conditions which any kind of 
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SD must meet, and which jointly enable the observer to identify SD cases with a high degree 
of probability. They are: (1) the contextual condition, comprising the circumstances 
conducive to SD; (2) the cognitive condition, picking the flaws in the reasoning and the 
biases in the data treatment leading to the false conclusion; (3) the motivational condition, 
referring to the desires, aims and emotions driving the agent, in the absence of which the 
flows could reasonably be avoided. As I said before, the contextual condition always 
concerns some evidence, available to the agent, which is threatening certain crucial wish, 
conviction, or aim of the agents, so that the wish, conviction, aim becomes emotionally 
overloaded. How such a condition can be instantiated, it changes from personal to political 
cases and from one type to another, but the elements of emotional pressure and evidence 
contrary to the wish or aim of the agent are always present.
Without claiming to have solved the political problem of deception, on the one hand, 
and of misperception, on the other, I hope to have contributed to the understanding of 
a phenomenon where misperception turns into deception of the public. I have also 
suggested a possible line of intervention along the line of pre-commitment (Elster 
1979), which however requires further reflection and a more precise proposal. Yet, 
before working out prophylactic measures for the SD of decision makers in politics, it is 
crucial that the problem must first be acknowledged.
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